Regulatory Report
By Richard Fama, J.D., Orla G. Thompson, J.D., Samantha Rubin Stratford, J.D., Emily M. Fulginiti, J.D., Maxwell Boyle, J.D., and Aline Peres Martins, J.D., Cozen O'Connor
Recall Litigation and Regulatory Trends: Worrisome Changes Bring Similar Results—For Now
Although recall statistics remained relatively static in 2025, changes to the regulatory landscape will pose challenges moving forward

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If years could have tag lines, 2025's would be "the more things change, the more they stay the same." Last year brought drastic reductions in funding at the federal level, with significant cuts at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). These funding cuts, along with the CDC's decision to scale back pathogen reporting requirements for the FoodNet program, led many to fear a sharp decrease in food safety. On the other hand, the Make America Healthy Again (MAHA) movement led by Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr., and echoed by state partners on a seemingly bipartisan basis, has given others hope for a brighter future.
Given the headlines coming out of 2025, it would be reasonable to expect a shift in recall patterns in the food industry. Yet, looking past the headlines and into the numbers, 2025 remained remarkably consistent with the past decade of recall trends, in terms of count and cause (Table 1).
TABLE 1. Food recalls by the numbers: despite headlines, a typical year for recalls (Image credit: Fama et al., adapted from FDA recall data1)
Recalls involving food products under FDA jurisdiction increased in 2025, with the year seeing 523 recalls, up from 431 in 2024. While a 102-recall increase may appear significant at first blush, it is squarely in line with typical year-over-year fluctuations over the last decade. USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)-related recalls tell the same story. FSIS oversaw 42 recalls in 2025 compared to 34 in 2024, a typical year-over-year change.2
The same point holds when you look at causation. FDA's cited causes in 2025 followed the same pattern established over the past decade. Recalls due to undeclared allergens led the way again, accounting for 34 percent of recalls in 2025. Pathogens were a close second, with Listeria, Salmonella, and E. coli again making up the bulk of pathogen-driven recalls. Critically, across causes, year-over-year percentage changes were in the single digits. These minor shifts reveal no obvious or significant shifts in enforcement priorities as far as recalls are concerned.
Anecdotally, numerous clients have asked some version of the following question throughout 2025: Given everything in the headlines about FDA and USDA, what should we expect USDA enforcement in the food industry to look like this year? The recall numbers clearly confirm—it was business as usual, at least in terms of the number of recalls. However, the story is still being written as to how federal funding cuts and shifts in administration priorities will affect the day-to-day realities of how recalls are carried out, such as the root-cause identifications for pathogen outbreaks and enforcement penalties (both criminal and civil) resulting from such recalls.
Food Recalls and Criminal Prosecutions: What to Expect from the Trump Administration
As of September 30, 2025, the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Consumer Protection Branch (CPB), first established in 1971, was eliminated. For more than 50 years, CPB acted as a unique hybrid, responsible for civil and criminal enforcement of statutes regulated by FDA, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). Importantly, CPB was tasked with enforcing the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the statute that empowers FDA to issue food recalls.
In one of its most notable prosecutions, CPB secured guilty verdicts, following a jury trial, against executives of the Peanut Corporation of America (PCA) for their roles in a deadly Salmonella outbreak tied to the company's peanut products. The outbreak resulted in one of the most extensive food safety recalls in history, spanning more than 3,900 products that utilized PCA's peanuts.3 At the time, DOJ issued a press release describing the prosecution as "just one more example of the forceful actions that the Department of Justice, with its agency partners, takes against any individual or company who compromises the safety of America's food supply for financial gain."4
Today, with CPB dissolved and many of its attorneys out the door, there remains an open question as to whether DOJ is well-equipped to prosecute another outbreak of that magnitude. DOJ's newly created Enforcement and Affirmative Litigation Branch will take over CPB's prior role in enforcing the FDCA, at least on the civil side. However, CPB's elimination creates a deficit in experience and expertise at DOJ. Moreover, this significant change comes on the heels of the deadly Boar's Head deli meat recall, which has been linked to 61 illnesses and ten deaths and prompted calls from lawmakers for a criminal investigation,5 and following the ByHeart infant formula recall, which is linked to over 51 illnesses across the country.
Adding to CPB's dissolution, in May 2025, the Trump Administration issued an executive order seeking to curb criminal enforcement of regulatory offenses. Executive Order 14294, entitled "Fighting Overcriminalization in Federal Regulations" (the "Executive Order"), articulates four policies to reduce criminal prosecutions of regulatory offenses:
- "Criminal enforcement of criminal regulatory offenses is disfavored"
- "Prosecution of criminal regulatory offenses is most appropriate for persons who know or can be presumed to know what is prohibited or required by the regulation and willingly choose not to comply, thereby causing or risking substantial public harm. Prosecutions of criminal regulatory offenses should focus on matters where a putative defendant is alleged to have known his conduct was unlawful"
- "Strict liability offenses are 'generally disfavored.' … Where enforcement is appropriate, agencies should consider civil rather than criminal enforcement of strict liability regulatory offenses or, if appropriate and consistent with due process and the right to jury trial, … administrative enforcement"
- "Agencies promulgating regulations potentially subject to criminal enforcement should explicitly describe the conduct subject to criminal enforcement, the authorizing statutes, and the mens rea standard applicable to those offenses."6
The Executive Order will considerably impact criminal prosecutions under the FDCA, which includes strict liability misdemeanors as an enforcement tool. Under 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1), individuals and companies may be convicted of certain FDCA violations, including the introduction of misbranded or adulterated foods into interstate commerce, absent proof of intent or knowledge of wrongdoing.7 Yet, the Executive Order emphasizes only prosecuting those with knowledge that their conduct was wrongful, and accordingly, appears to eviscerate the use of § 333(a)(1). Looking back, this policy shift would not have impacted the criminal prosecutions of the PCA executives, who were charged with felonies under the FDCA. However, criminal prosecutions under the FDCA will likely decrease in light of the Executive Order.
Although criminal prosecutions under the FDCA may decrease, civil enforcement actions, both federally and at the state level, appear poised to ramp up in today's MAHA climate. In 2025, the Attorney General of Texas, Ken Paxton, launched investigations into General Mills, Mars, and Kellogg's over synthetic dyes. Kellogg's and General Mills have since agreed to remove food dyes from their products. Attorney General Paxton also launched investigations into baby food manufacturers over heavy metals, while Attorney General Kris Mayes of Arizona and Attorney General Brian Schwalb of Washington, D.C. urged FDA to take action regarding heavy metals in commercial baby food. At the federal level, all eyes will be on DOJ's new Enforcement and Affirmative Litigation Branch to see how it enforces the MAHA agenda with respect to food safety.
“The past few years have ushered in a new, unwelcome twist—consumer class action lawsuits over the voluntary recall of food products.”

The Post-Recall Consumer Class Action Litigation Trend Continues
Food safety concerns, regulatory scrutiny and oversight, reputational damage, the specter of personal injury lawsuits, and an irreparable hit to the company's bottom line—it is beyond debate that recalls have always been stressful to food manufacturers and sellers. However, the past few years have ushered in a new, unwelcome twist—consumer class action lawsuits over the voluntary recall of food products.
Like traditional consumer class action lawsuits alleging false and deceptive labeling and advertising that have plagued the food industry for decades, plaintiffs in these suits generally do not allege personal injuries arising from their consumption or use of the recalled products. Rather, they typically claim that they were denied the benefit-of-the-bargain because the products they and the putative class purchased did not perform as expected and, as a result, they would not have purchased the recalled products, or they would have paid less for them, had they known of the products' defects. Plaintiffs bringing these actions also typically seek injunctive relief—generally a court order prohibiting the manufacturer or seller from selling contaminated or adulterated products.
The primary hurdle confronting would-be class action plaintiffs in these cases is whether they have "standing" to bring their claims. To demonstrate standing, plaintiffs must sufficiently allege an "injury in fact," meaning that they must plausibly plead that they have suffered or will imminently suffer a specific, concrete, and actual harm. Notably, "named plaintiffs who represent a class must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent."8
Another challenge facing such plaintiffs is whether the manufacturers' voluntary recall and associated refund programs render their purely economic claims moot. Stated differently, have the manufacturers' recall and refund programs fully compensated the plaintiffs for their alleged economic damages, thereby obviating the need for the lawsuit?
Most of the class action lawsuits arising out of product recalls filed since 2022 have been brought by the same handful of lawyers, and several of those cases have resulted in multi-million-dollar settlements.9 Interestingly, virtually all of these settlements occurred before the defendants filed their answers or motions to dismiss, providing a strong indication that the settlements were likely prompted by the defendants' desire to avoid costly and protracted litigation altogether.
However, there have been a number of recent lawsuits where defendants successfully challenged plaintiffs' ability to bring such claims. These suits, and the courts' decisions and orders dismissing them, provide food manufacturers and sellers with guidance should they become embroiled in post-recall consumer class actions.
In Ward et. al. v. J.M. Smucker Company,10 the plaintiffs sought purely economic benefit-of-the-bargain type damages arising from their purchases of Jif brand peanut butter products that were voluntarily recalled due to potential Salmonella contamination. Smucker moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims on the grounds that the named plaintiffs lack standing to sue. That motion was granted by the district court. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit confirmed that to establish standing, plaintiffs must allege facts sufficient to raise a plausible inference that the products they purchased were contaminated. However, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that they had standing to sue simply because they purchased products that were subject to Smucker's voluntary recall, relying on well-settled law that the "mere fact that a product purchased by plaintiffs was recalled does not nudge a claim of alleged contamination from conceivable to plausible." The Sixth Circuit was equally unpersuaded by the plaintiffs' reliance on FDA recall statistics, which purportedly showed that 16 reported cases of Salmonella infection were traced to consumption of Jif peanut butter. Specifically, the Court held that "[u]nder these alleged facts, it is possible that one or more Plaintiffs purchased contaminated peanut butter. But mere possibility is not enough—the allegations must cross the line from possible to plausible."
In McLean v. Walmart,11 a class action lawsuit litigated by Cozen O'Connor, the representative plaintiff sued Walmart for alleged economic benefit-of-the-bargain damages allegedly arising out of the voluntary recall of apple juice due to the potential that it was contaminated with elevated levels of inorganic arsenic. In its motion to dismiss, Walmart argued that the plaintiff's claims were barred for lack of standing or rendered moot by Walmart's refund program, which offered a full refund of the purchase price of the recalled products. However, in an effort to create standing, the plaintiff argued that the full refund of the purchase price he paid would not compensate him for the temporary deprivation and lost time value of money—apparently referring to the time between his alleged purchase of the recalled products and his receipt of a refund. Significantly, the plaintiff did not claim that there existed any impediment to him taking advantage of Walmart's refund program.
In its decision, the district court explained that "[t]he difference between standing and mootness doctrine is merely one of time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness)." On this basis, the court held that "[b]ecause [Walmart's] refund program started before the instant litigation, standing, rather than mootness, is the appropriate lens through which to view Walmart's challenge." Turning to the issue of standing, the court analyzed cases from different jurisdictions that came to differing conclusions. Ultimately, the Court distinguished this case from others in which the refund programs were plagued with problems, such as "unresponsive web pages and long wait times for replacement units that never arrive" that prevented the plaintiffs from "taking advantage of the supposed recall," and held that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue.
More recently, courts have applied similar reasoning in other post-recall contexts. In Catalano v. Grimmway Enterprises, Inc., a federal court in the Southern District of New York dismissed with prejudice a putative class action arising from a nationwide recall of carrot products due to potential E. coli12 contamination. The court held that the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that the carrots he purchased were contaminated, particularly where he alleged that he consumed the product without incident. The court reasoned that "[t]he only reasonable inference" from such allegations was that the product was not contaminated and the plaintiff therefore suffered no concrete economic injury. The court further emphasized that a recall alone does not establish standing and that the mere risk of contamination, absent actual harm or plausible allegations of purchase of a contaminated product, is insufficient to confer Article III standing.
Another putative class action lawsuit of interest for those concerned about this trend is Wilim v. Hillshire Brands Company, et al.,13 which was brought by the same lawyers as those involved in McLean v. Walmart. In the complaint, Wilim attempted to satisfy his pleading requirement regarding standing by alleging that the defendants' recall was somehow insufficient.14 However, the complaint also alleged that "[p]laintiff did not discover any wood pieces in the portion of the product consumed, but nevertheless was forced to purchase, store, and ingest a product that has now been declared adulterated, unsafe, and unfit for human consumption by federal regulators,"15 thereby potentially leaving open the argument that the plaintiff lacked standing because he did not plausibly plead that the product he purchased was contaminated with wooden stick pieces. Notably, the plaintiff dismissed the action with prejudice before the defendant filed its answer—an indication that plaintiff's counsel likely recognized the apparent lack of standing and settled the matter on an individual basis for a relatively nominal sum.
It is critical to note that the law governing standing and mootness varies by jurisdiction. As a result, while the holdings in Ward and McLean offer hope to sellers who find themselves named as defendants in post-recall consumer class action lawsuits, it is important to consult with counsel with experience defending these types of cases. Regardless of the jurisdiction, manufacturers and sellers who encounter issues with their products will be well served by undertaking timely voluntary recalls and carrying out well-run recall and refund programs, where appropriate.
“Several states have also passed legislation for the elimination of certain food dyes—statewide and in their public schools—with some of these deadlines preceding the deadlines provided by the federal government.”

Petroleum-Based Food Dyes, MAHA, and Recalls: A Perfect Storm
The year 2025 also proved eventful for petroleum-based, synthetic food dyes—cementing the end of these dyes in foods and ingested drugs.
FDA, under two administrations, issued numerous directives announcing bans on the use of petroleum-based synthetic food dyes. Under the Biden administration, FDA issued an Order16 on January 16, 2025 banning Red No. 3 in food and ingested drugs because it was found to cause cancer in male lab rats. As a result, FDA concluded that the Delaney Clause of the FDAC17 required the prohibition of the additive. The Delaney Clause states that a color or food additive is unsafe if the additive is found to induce cancer when ingested by human or animal. Food and ingested drug manufacturers who use Red No. 3 have until January 15, 2027 or January 18, 2028, respectively, to reformulate their products.
However, on April 22, 2025 and as part of the Trump administration's MAHA initiative, HHS and FDA announced a plan (but not an Order) to phase out all remaining petroleum-based, synthetic dyes, including Green No. 3, Red No. 40, Yellow No. 5, Yellow No. 6, Blue No. 1, and Blue No. 2, from the food supply by the end of 2026.18 Notably, the plan included expediting the removal of Red No. 3 ahead of the 2027 and 2028 deadlines. On July 14, 2025, FDA issued additional guidance encouraging food manufacturers to phase out Red No. 3 ahead of the previous 2027 deadline and "as soon as is practicably possible," with the goal of completing the phase-out before the January 15, 2027 deadline. FDA also launched a webpage titled, "Industry Tracker: Pledges to Remove Petroleum-Based Food Dyes,"19 noting commitments from large food manufacturers to phase out the color additives. To further incentivize the phase-out, in February 2026, FDA announced that it intends to exercise enforcement discretion as to section 403(a)(1) of FDCA. Under the new policy, FDA will not take enforcement action against a firm if it makes one of the following voluntary labeling claims on foods intended for human consumption that do not contain any of the color additives in 21 CFR part 74: (1) Made without artificial food colors/colorings; (2) No artificial color/colors/coloring; or 3) No added artificial color/colors/coloring.
Several states have also passed legislation for the elimination of certain food dyes—statewide and in their public schools—with some of these deadlines preceding the deadlines provided by the federal government. For example, California passed AB 418 in 2023, the California Food Safety Act, which, among other things, provided for a statewide ban on Red Dye No. 3, effective January 1, 2027. California also passed AB 2316, the California School Food Safety Act, which prohibits public schools from serving foods containing six synthetic food dyes, including Red No. 40, Yellow No. 5, Yellow No. 6, Blue No. 1, Blue No. 2, and Green No. 3. This ban goes into effect on December 31, 2027.
West Virgina and Utah have similar bans on certain food dyes in public schools, including Red No. 3, with West Virgina having an effective date of August 1, 2025 and Utah of May 7, 2025. West Viriginia also enacted a statewide ban on Red No. 3, Red No. 40, Yellow No. 5, Yellow No. 6, Blue No. 1, Blue No. 2, and Green No. 3 from all foods sold in the state starting January 1, 2028. However, the International Association of Color Manufacturers (IACM) challenged the legislation, in part, as unconstitutionally vague, and a federal judge granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement.20
This raises an interesting issue of whether federal law preempts state laws on food dye bans. The FDCA does not contain a provision preventing states from passing such laws, so there is no express preemption. The issue is, therefore, whether there is implied preemption—i.e., whether the federal government intends to "occupy the field" by creating legislation so pervasive that it is clear that the government solely intends to regulate food additives/dyes, or whether there is a conflict of laws such that it would be impossible to comply with both. To date, industry has not challenged the various state laws banning food additives/dyes on federal preemption grounds. Furthermore, in March 2025, HHS Secretary Robert Kennedy endorsed West Virigina's state-wide ban on certain food additives and commended the "twenty-four states pushing MAHA bills to clean up our food system [and] improve school lunches..."21 With this background, it seems unlikely that courts would find that there is implied preemption.
Additionally, the presence of food dyes has led to a small number of food recalls over the years, with a slight increase from 2024 to 2025. However, the significant increase in negative rumblings surrounding petroleum-based food dyes from both sides of the political aisle has also raised the risk of consumer class action litigation even when use of the dyes is still permissible. Given the negative health effects now associated with petroleum-based food dyes, sellers must be mindful of the types of claims they are making on the labeling of products containing these additives. In May 2025, Chelsi Hendrix brought a consumer class action lawsuit against Handle's Enterprises for allegedly misrepresenting, among other things, that its "homemade" ice cream is made with "the best ingredients," despite containing ingredients with negative connotations, including petroleum-based food dyes.22 Handle's moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint and, as of the time this article was written, the plaintiff had not responded to that motion.
Tightening State Regulations Raise the Risk of More Recalls and Resulting Litigation
State regulators have cast a wide net going well beyond the banning of petroleum-based food dyes. Several states have enacted legislation seeking increased regulation over, among other things, heavy metals in baby food and spices, foods containing potentially harmful food additives, and per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) in food packaging. Each of these regulations, some of which are summarized below, have the potential to prompt recalls as well as personal injury and consumer class action litigation.
Baby Food
California's AB 899, effective January 1, 2024 (monthly testing) and January 1, 2025 (public disclosure), requires manufacturers of baby and toddler foods (excluding infant formula) to test finished products no less than monthly for arsenic, cadmium, lead, and mercury. Manufacturers must also publish their testing results, with QR codes enabling consumer access from labels.23 Failure to test, disclose, or maintain records exposes firms to enforcement by the California Department of Public Health and potential actions under state consumer protection laws. This legislation supplements California's Proposition 65, which already regulates warning requirements for, among other things, products exposing consumers to certain heavy metals, including arsenic, cadmium, lead, and mercury.
Maryland, Virginia, and Illinois also enacted similar transparency/testing regimes, often leveraging QR codes.24 However, access and usability differ significantly. Practically speaking, once a state identifies noncompliance or elevated test results, it can: (1) issue warning letters, (2) publicize findings that effectively pull products off shelves, or (3) coordinate formal recalls where contamination levels or misbranding warrant.
Spices
New York's Department of Agriculture and Markets, with the Department of Health, analyzed more than 1,000 spice samples and established aggressive action levels for inorganic arsenic, cadmium, and lead—approximately 0.21 ppm (As), 0.26 ppm (Cd), and 0.21 ppm (Pb), respectively—which are well below earlier Class II thresholds.25 These function as state recall triggers, empowering regulators to deem products adulterated and to pursue Class II recalls (and Class I for acute hazards).
Environmental groups have backed legislation to further codify and enforce maximum lead levels across spice categories and to authorize swift Attorney General enforcement, reinforcing the states' ability to order removals/recalls when thresholds are exceeded.26
Additionally, the American Spice Trade Association has updated guidance recognizing evolving federal and state enforcement on metals in spices, underscoring that New York's standards can have national implications because distributors often cannot segregate New York‑compliant supply chains.27 This dynamic increases the potential for broader market withdrawals and litigation when lots test above New York's action levels.
Food Additives
Signed June 22, 2025, Texas' SB 25 requires warning labels for foods containing any of 44 specified additives (including many synthetic colors, potassium bromate, partially hydrogenated oils, and other substances), with a standardized warning indicating that the ingredient is "not recommended" for human consumption by named foreign authorities. The law also creates a Nutrition Advisory Committee and expands nutrition education in schools and medical training. Implementation runs into 2027.
“As of December 2025, at least 14 states have enacted laws restricting or banning PFAS in food packaging, with ten additional states considering legislation.”

PFAS
In February 2024, FDA announced that PFAS‑containing grease‑proofing agents for paper and paperboard food packaging are no longer being sold for food‑contact use in the U.S., completing a voluntary industry phase‑out that FDA spearheaded beginning in 2020.28
Even so, FDA continues PFAS surveillance in foods and has taken action, including recalls, where levels indicated potential health concerns, reinforcing that dietary PFAS exposures can arise beyond packaging. Crucially, however, FDA's approach leaves intact, and arguably encourages, a patchwork of state PFAS packaging laws, exposing food companies to recall-like outcomes when packaging fails to meet the strictest applicable state standard.
As of December 2025, at least 14 states have enacted laws restricting or banning PFAS in food packaging, with ten additional states considering legislation. These statutes vary in scope, timing, and legal trigger, but collectively cover many of the most common packaging formats used in the food industry—wrappers, bowls, clamshells, pizza boxes, and microwave popcorn bags.
Since most national brands often cannot operationally segment packaging by state, these laws function in practice as de facto nationwide standards, particularly when enforced by large states such as California, New York, and Washington.
New York and California prohibit the sale or distribution of food packaging containing PFAS. As of December 2022, New York banned food packaging with intentionally added PFAS.29 California goes further, banning food packaging that either contains intentionally added PFAS or exceeds 100 ppm total organic fluorine, regardless of intent, a unique quantitative standard among the states.30 These statutes allow regulators to treat noncompliant packaging as unlawful articles of commerce, enabling mandatory removal from store shelves and triggering product withdrawals that mirror food recalls, even when the food itself is uncontaminated.
Some states impose PFAS restrictions only after determination that safer alternatives are available. For example, Washington employs a category-based, phased ban, with successive implementation dates for packaging types (e.g., wraps and pizza boxes in 2023; bowls and closed containers in 2024) once alternatives are identified by the Department of Ecology.31
Furthermore, Maine initially adopted a broader, notification-based approach requiring disclosures of PFAS in products, with evolving interpretations of its applicability to food packaging. By 2032, a person may not sell or distribute any product that contains intentionally added PFAS, unless the Maine Department of Environmental Protection has determined that the use of PFAS in the product is unavoidable.32 This structure creates uncertainty for manufacturers, as regulatory findings, not legislation alone, can suddenly convert lawful packaging into a banned product class, necessitating rapid packaging changes or market exits.
Finally, there are currently ten pending state bills, underscoring that PFAS packaging regulation is expanding geographically. Surprisingly, there have only been two reported recalls associated with PFAS in food, both initiated in 2022.33 However, the recent increase in regulations surrounding PFAS will likely make PFAS-related recalls far more likely in the future. Also, as is often the case, consumer class action lawyers have been ahead of the curve, regularly bringing PFAS-related lawsuits, but with mixed results.
For example, in late 2024, consumer class actions were filed against the Hershey Company for the alleged presence of PFAS in the packaging of its confectionary products.34 In the summer of 2025, Hershey filed its motion to dismiss the consolidated complaints challenging the plaintiffs' PFAS test results and standing to sue. That motion remains pending. Similarly, a consumer class action lawsuit was filed in the Southern District of New York against the Coca Cola Company for alleged PFAS in certain of its juice products. In that suit, the plaintiff claimed that the juice products were falsely labeled as "made simply" or as containing "all natural ingredients" because they allegedly contained PFAS. Notably, on September 29, 2025, the Court dismissed the suit based upon the plaintiff's lack of standing due to defects in his testing allegations.35
These suits highlight the technical difficulties with PFAS testing and the practical challenges associated with the identification of the source of alleged contamination, given the ubiquity of PFAS in the environment.
FIGURE 1. The Three Types of Evidence for Foodborne Illness Outbreak Investigations: Epidemiologic ("Epi"), Traceback, and Laboratory Data ("Lab Data") (Credit: FDA)

Conclusion
The year 2025 was certainly an interesting one. Although recall statistics remained relatively static against prior years, changes to the regulatory landscape and a reduction of federal resources devoted to food safety are sure to challenge us all moving forward.
It has been said that "[i]n any given moment, we have two options: to step forward into growth or step back into safety."36 For 2026, let us collectively strive to take a step forward into safety, toward a world with far fewer foodborne illnesses and recalls (and, hopefully, a few less consumer class actions as well).
References
- U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). "Recalls Dashboard." https://datadashboard.fda.gov/oii/cd/recalls.htm.
- U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection Service (USDA-FSIS). "Recalls & Public Health Alerts." https://www.fsis.usda.gov/recalls.
- USDA, Economic Research Service (USDA-ERS). Wittenberger, K. and E. Dohlman. "Peanut Outlook Impacts of the 2008–09 Foodborne Illness Outbreak Linked to Salmonella in Peanuts." February 2010. https://ers.usda.gov/sites/default/files/_laserfiche/outlooks/37835/8684_ocs10a01_1_.pdf.
- Department of Justice. "Press Release: Former Peanut Company President Receives Largest Criminal Sentence in Food Safety Case; Two Others also Sentenced for Their Roles in Salmonella-Tainted Peanut Product Outbreak." September 21, 2015. https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/former-peanut-company-president-receives-largest-criminal-sentence-food-safety-case-two.
- Richard Blumenthal Newsroom. "Boar's Head-Linked Listeria Outbreak: Blumenthal Announces Federal Investigation into USDA Response." October 15, 2024. https://www.blumenthal.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/boars-head-linked-listeria-outbreak-blumenthal-announces-federal-investigation-into-usda-response.
- Executive Order No. 14294. "Fighting Overcriminalization in Federal Regulations." May 9, 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/05/fighting-overcriminalization-in-federal-regulations/.
- See 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1).
- Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org. 426 U.S. 26. 40. 1976. (Internal citations omitted.)
- Quaker Oats, $6.75 million settlement; Mid America Pet Food, $5.5 million settlement; TreeHouse Foods, $4 million settlement; and Boar's Head Provisions, $3.1 million settlement.
- 5:22-cv-00885. N.D. Ohio.
- 5:24-CV-5189. 2025 WL 1402466. W.D. Ark. May 14, 2025.
- 7:24 cv 08817, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. March 13, 2026).
- 1:25-cv-12281. N.D. Ill.
- See Complaint, paragraphs 26 through 29.
- See Complaint, paragraph 18 (emphasis added).
- Center for Science in the Public Interest, et al. "Request To Revoke Color Additive Listing for Use of FD&C Red No. 3 in Food and Ingested Drugs." 21 CFR 74. January 16, 2025. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/16/2025-00830/color-additive-petition-from-center-for-science-in-the-public-interest-et-al-request-to-revoke-color.
- See 21 U.S.C. § 379e and § 348(c)(3).
- FDA. "HHS, FDA to Phase Out Petroleum-Based Synthetic Dyes in Nation's Food Supply." Current as of April 22, 2025. https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/hhs-fda-phase-out-petroleum-based-synthetic-dyes-nations-food-supply.
- FDA. "Tracking Food Industry Pledges to Remove Petroleum Based Food Dyes." Current as of March 25, 2026. https://www.fda.gov/food/color-additives-information-consumers/tracking-food-industry-pledges-remove-petroleum-based-food-dyes.
- International Association of Color Manufacturers v. Arvin Singh. No. 2:25-cv-00588. Memorandum and Order. ECF. No. 21, S.D.W. Va. December 23, 2025.
- Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). "HHS Supports State Legislation Banning Harmful Food Dyes From School Lunches in West Virgina." March 28, 2025. https://www.hhs.gov/press-room/west-virginia-morrisey-ban-food-dyes-schools-snap.html.
- Hendrix v. Handel's Enterprises, LLC. 2:25CV01428. E.D. Cal.
- California Legislature. "AB899 Food Safety: Baby Food." 2023–2024. LegiScan. https://legiscan.com/CA/text/AB899/id/2778090.
- Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. § 21-330.4; Va. Code Ann. § 3.2-5125.1; 410 Ill. Comp. Stat. 620/11.7.
- New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets. "Heavy Metals in Spices." https://agriculture.ny.gov/heavy-metals-spices.
- See, e.g., Environmental Advocates NY. " Reducing Allowable Lead Levels in Spices." https://www.eany.org/memo/reducing-allowable-lead-levels-in-spices.
- American Spice Trade Association. "ASTA Guidance Levels for Heavy Metals in Spices." May 3, 2025. https://astaspice.org/safe-view/1319682.
- FDA. "FDA Announces PFAS Used in Grease-Proofing Agents for Food Packaging No Longer Being Sold in the U.S." Constituent Update. February 28, 2024. https://www.fda.gov/food/hfp-constituent-updates/fda-announces-pfas-used-grease-proofing-agents-food-packaging-no-longer-being-sold-us and FDA. "FDA, Industry Actions End Sales of PFAS Used in US Food Packaging." February 28, 2024. https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-industry-actions-end-sales-pfas-used-us-food-packaging.
- New York State. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 37-0209. McKinney 2023.
- California Health and Safety Code § 109000.
- RCW 70A.222.070.
- Maine Legislature. 32 M.S.R.A. 26-A.1733, LD 217, and LD 1537.
- FDA. "Bumble Bee Foods, LLC Issues Voluntary Recall on 3.75 Oz Smoked Clams Due to the Presence of Detectable Levels of PFAS Chemicals." July 6, 2022. https://www.fda.gov/safety/recalls-market-withdrawals-safety-alerts/bumble-bee-foods-llc-issues-voluntary-recall-375-oz-smoked-clams-due-presence-detectable-levels-pfas and FDA. "Crown Prince, Inc. Issues Voluntary Recall of Smoked Baby Clams in Olive Oil Due to the Presence of Detectable Levels of PFAS Chemicals." July 15, 2022. https://www.fda.gov/safety/recalls-market-withdrawals-safety-alerts/crown-prince-inc-issues-voluntary-recall-smoked-baby-clams-olive-oil-due-presence-detectable-levels.
- In re Hershey Chocolate Litigation. 1:24-cv-01868 (MDPA).
- Lurenz v. Coca-Cola Co. 2025 WL 2773188. S.D.N.Y. September 29, 2025.
- Maslow, A. The Psychology of Science. Maurice Bassett Publishing, 1966.
Richard Fama, J.D. is a Member of Cozen O'Connor's Commercial Litigation, Product Liability, and Product Regulatory and Compliance practices. He represents companies in the food, pet food, beverage, dietary supplement, cannabis, and consumer products industries in matters involving labeling and advertising claims, class action consumer fraud, product liability, and mass and toxic tort issues.
Orla G. Thompson, J.D. is a Member of Cozen O'Connor's Commercial Litigation, Product Liability, and Product Regulatory and Compliance practices. She defends food manufacturers and suppliers in product liability cases, including class actions and multi-plaintiff claims involving product withdrawals, recalls, and false advertisement.
Samantha Rubin Stratford, J.D. is a Member of Cozen O'Connor's White Collar Defense and Investigations practice. She counsels individuals facing charges for money laundering, loan fraud, securities fraud, criminal contempt, and other offenses.
Emily M. Fulginiti, J.D. is an Associate in Cozen O'Connor's Commercial Litigation, Product Liability, and Product Regulatory and Compliance practices. She handles product liability matters for food and beverage and consumer products manufacturers and suppliers.
Maxwell Boyle, J.D. is an Associate in Cozen O'Connor's Commercial Litigation, Product Liability, and Product Regulatory and Compliance practices. Max advises on the regulatory and class action litigation landscape within the food and beverage industry.
Aline Peres Martins, J.D. is a Law Clerk at Cozen O'Connor.

